Using a simple game-theoretical model of contests, we compare the effort exerted by rugby teams under three different point systems used in tournaments around the world. The scoring systems under consideration are NB, +4 and 3+. We state models of the games under the three point systems, both static and dynamic. In all those models we find that the 3+ system ranks first, +4 second and N B third. We run empirical analyses using data from matches under the three scoring systems. The results of those statistical analyses confirm our theoretical conclusions.
Motivation
Rugby is a sport in constant evolution. This can be easily seen in the fact that its rules are being continuously reevaluated. This leads to experiments in which alternative rules are tested and, if the results are satisfactory, become part of the rulebook. These continuous revisions and modifications are intended to increase both the safety of the players and the pleasure of watching the game. That is, some rules are changed to make the game safer, reducing the number of injuries suffered by the players, while others are modified to make the game more entertaining for players, coaches and spectators alike. Some of the latter kind of modifications involve the points awarded to teams, depending on, among other factors, the number of tries scored. Fortunately for the exploration of alternative rules, the organizers of tournaments are given a free hand to choose the point system to be applied and thus to experiment with those variations. For example, in the World Cup (or in the Rugby Championship, a tournament in which the only participants are the best four national teams of the Southern Hemisphere), four points are awarded to the winning team, two to each team in case of a tie and no points to the losing team. Besides the points awarded for winning, tying or losing a game, an extra point (usually called bonus point) is awarded to the team that scores four or more tries, and an extra point to the losing team, if the difference in the score is seven points or less. Another point system used around the world, for example in the Super Rugby or French Top 14, two of the most important club tournaments in the world, consists in giving an extra point to the winning team if it scores three more tries than its rival, and an extra point is awarded to the losing team if the difference in the score is seven or less. In this work we compare the effort of the teams under these two point systems as well as under the point system in which no bonus points are awarded. Clearly, there is no consensus on which one is the best, reflected in the fact that different important tournaments around the world use different point systems. But there exists a consensus on that games are more entertaining when teams fight to the end to win a match. This behavior can be induced by point rules that give incentives to teams to exert more effort in order to succeed. To start analyzing the effort aspects of point systems, notice that there are different ways in which a team can score in rugby . One is by grounding the ball in the other team's ingoal. 1 This is called scoring a try and the team that does it, earns five points. When a team scores a try, it can opt to kick to the posts, getting two more points. On the other hand, a kick from the ground (called a penalty kick) or a drop kick (a kick after the ball bounced) that goes through the posts, awards the team three points. The aforementioned scoring methods are under evaluation. World Rugby (the international governing body of rugby union) is interested in knowing whether giving more points for a try or giving less for a place kick induces teams to score more tries. A common understanding of a team devoting more effort in a game is that it plays more offensively, defends with more attitude and forces its players to play as hard as they can. We want to see if the effort spent in each bonus point system correlates in some way with the number of tries. We intend to determine, resorting to a game-theoretical analysis, which point system induces teams to devote more effort. Furthermore, using real-world data we check the validity of our theoretical conclusions, which can be useful for sports planners who intend to design tournaments on sound theoretical and empirical grounds. Although a sport like rugby can be really difficult to model, due to the presence of variables with an uncountable number of possible values, there are effective ways of simplifying the analysis. The use of a simple gametheoretical model of contests allows to predict the behavior of the teams and to find the most adequate strategies for each instance of a match. Some of the authors that have modeled different aspects of sports using game-theoretical tools are Walker and Woodens (2001) for tennis, Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose (2002), Palomino, Rigotti and Rustichini (1999) in the case of soccer and Petróczi and Haugen (2012) to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-doping policies. An analysis particularly relevant for our purposes compares the strategies of two soccer teams under the two and the three points scoring systems (Brocas and Carrillo, 2004) . The authors conclude, rather unsurprisingly, that teams become more offensive if they are awarded three points when they win. But interestingly, they also find that by giving more than three points to a winner makes the teams more defensive in the first half of the game and so, in average, higher offensiveness is not induced by this point system. In our case, we start modeling a rugby game statically, comparing the effort devoted by the teams under different point systems. We seek to find out which one pushes teams to the limit, making the game more entertaining.
We then try to answer the same question, this time in the framework of a dynamic model, using the results of Massó -Neme (1996) , by analyzing the feasible and equilibrium payoffs. We consider the average of joint efforts used to obtain those equilibrum payoffs in each point system, to find out which one induces the teams to play more agressively. Finally, we check the real-world validity of our conclusions using data from different tournaments around the world. The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the static model and examine the degrees of offensiveness associated to the different point systems. In Section 3 we do the same, but in the context of a dynamic model. We find that the order of offensiveness is the same in both cases, being 3+ the system that ranks on the top. In Section 4 we run empirical analyses in order to corroborate the validity of those results, which are confirmed by the data of various tournaments under the three systems. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Static Model
We intend here to model, in a simple way, the effects of point systems on the choice of the levels of effort of teams. We consider two teams, A and B. The possible events in a match are denoted (a, b) ∈ N 0 × N 0 , where N 0 represents the natural numbers plus 0. Letters a and b stand for the tries scored by teams A and B, respectively. To simplify the analysis, we disregard the precise differences between goals, penalty kicks or drop kicks, and just focus on the tries scored and the joint efforts of the teams. In each event, we consider a contest in which two riskneutral contestants are competing to score a try, and win the points awarded by the points system. 2 The contestants differ in their valuation of the prize. Each contestant i ∈ {A, B} independently exerts an irreversible and costly effort e i ≥ 0, which will determine, through a contest success function (CSF), which team wins the points. Formally, the CSF maps the profile of efforts (e A , e B ) into probabilities of scoring a try. We adopt the logit formulation, since it is the most widely used in the analysis of sporting contests (Dietl et al., 2011) . Its general form was introduced by Tullock (1980), although we use it here with a slight modification: 3
When a bonus point is given for scoring 4 or more tries, and for losing by one try (+4 system) the functions are: 
Finally, when a difference of 3 tries gives the winning team a bonus point and losing by one try gives the bonus point to the loser (3+ system) we have:
In all three cases the utility functions represent the weighted sum of three probabilities, namely that of team A scoring, that of none of the teams scoring and that of team B scoring. The corresponding weights are the points earned in each case plus the gain of blocking the other team, precluding it of winning points. This gain is defined as the difference between the points that the other team can earn if it scores and the points they get times , where 0 < << 1 is not very large. This intends to measure the importance of blocking the other team and not letting it score and earn more points. Teams are playing a tournament, so making it hard for the other team to earn points is an incentive (although not a great one) in a match. The way we define the utility function rests on the simple idea that to score four tries, one has to be scored first. This captures the assumption that teams care only about the immediate result of scoring, and not about what can happen later. Under these assumptions, we seek to find the equilibria corresponding to the three point systems. The appropriate notion of equilibrium here is in terms of strict dominant strategies since the chances of each team are independent of what the other does. Notice that, trivially, each dominant strategies equilibrium is (the unique) Nash equilibrium in the game. 5 Once obtained these equilibria, the next step of the analysis is to compare them, to determine how the degree of offensiveness changes with the change of rules. This comparison is defined in terms of the following relation:
where (e A , e B ) (e A , e B ) is understood as "with (e A , e B ) both teams exert more effort than with (e A , e B )".
We look for the maximum number of tries that can be scored by a team, in order to limit the number of cases to analyze. We use the statistics of games played in different tournaments around the world, which show that, in average, teams can get at most 7 tries ([12]- [23] )(see Section 4). This, in turn leads us to 64 possible instances (events).
At each event we compare the equilibrium strategies. We thus obtain a ranking of the point systems, based on the relation. The reaction function of team i, describing the best response to any possible effort choice of the other team, can be computed from the following first order conditions:
for team A, and 5 Nash equilibria exist since the game trivially satisfies the condition of having compact and convex spaces of strategies while the utility functions have the expected probability form, which ensures that the best response correspondence has a fixed point.
for team B, where k A and k B obtain by rearranging the constants of the corresponding utility function. The equilibrium (e * A , e * B ) in pure strategies is characterized by the intersection of the two reaction functions and is given by:
As an example, consider, without loss of generality, a particular instance (for simplicity we omit the arguments):
The Nash (dominant strategies) equilibrium is given by (e * A , e * B ) = (0, 0)
The equilibrium is (e * A , e * B ) = (
Since we assume that is sufficiently small, we can infer that teams will exert more effort under the 3+ system, then in the +4 and finally in the N B. The comparison of all the possible events yields: Proposition 1. The 3+ system is the Condorcet winner in the comparison among the point systems. By the same token, teams exert more effort under the +4 system than in the N B one.
Proof. We analyze the 64 possible events. Table 1 shows the results favoring team A. By symmetry, analogous results can be found for team B. Consider the following pairwise comparisons:
• N B vs. 3+: 22 events rank higher under 3+, while 7 under NB.
• +4 vs. N B: 22 events for the former against 7 with the latter.
• 3+ vs. +4: 16 with the former against 6 with +4.
This indicates that 3+ is the Condorcet winner, while N B is the Condorcet loser.
Events
NB ∼ +4 3+ (4,4), (5, 5) ,(6,6), (7,7) ( (4 + 4 ) 3 4c(4 + 4 ) 2 , In this section we model a rugby game following the argumentation line in Massó -Neme (1996) . We conceive it as a dynamic game in which the feasible and equilibrium payoffs of the teams under the three point systems can be compared. In this setting, we first find the minimax feasible payoffs in every point system. 6 This minimax payoff defines a region of equilibrium payoffs. We consider the Nash equilibriums used to reach this minimax payoffs in and take the average joint efforts in each system. Again, we want to find which point system makes the teams spend more effort in order to attain the equilibirum payoffs. Formally, let us define a dynamic game as G = ({A, B}, (W, (0, 0)), E * , T ), where:
1. There are again two teams, A and B. A generic team will be denoted by i.
2. We restrict the choices of actions to a finite set of joint actions E * where E * = {(e A , e B ) ∈ R 2 + } where each e i was used in a Nash equilibrium of the static game. In each case, we say that two scores belong to the same event if the two teams get the same payoffs in both cases in a finite instantaneous game in normal form defined as 4. All the point systems have the same initial event, namely (0, 0).
5.
A transition function T , which specifies the new event as a function of the current event and the joint actions taken by both teams. Therefore
The transition function has only three possible outcomes (we use a representative element, i.e. a pair of scores, for any event in W ):
These outcomes represent the fact that, upon a choice of joint efforts, either no team scores, A scores or B scores, respectively.
Some further definitions will be useful in the rest of this work:
is a history of joint efforts of length t. We denote by H 0 = {e} the set of histories of length 0, with e standing for the empty history. Let H = ∪ ∞ t=0 H t be the set of all possible histories in G.
We define recursively a sequence of t+1 steps of events starting with (a, b),
, where (h 0 , . . . , h t ) ∈ H is such that for each j = 0, . . . , t, h j−1 is the initial segment of h j and h j \h j−1 is the event exerted at the j-th step. 7 We will denote by F i the set of all these functions for team i and, by extension, we define
Thus, any f ∈ F defines recursively a sequence of consecutive histories. We also have that f defines a sequence of instantaneous games for each scoring system S defined as (a, b) That is, a stationary strategy only depends on the event at which it is applied, and not on how the event was reached. We note the set of stationary strategies as S ⊆ F and in what follows we only consider strategies drawn from this set. In other words, we assume that teams act disregarding how a stage of the game was reached and play only according to the current state of affairs. For example, if the match at t is tied (3, 3) , teams A and B will play in the same way, irrespectively of whether the score before was (3, 0) or (0, 3). It can be argued that the assumption of stationarity does not seem to hold in some real-world cases since the way a given score is reached may take an emotional toll on teams. If, say, A is winning at (4, 0), and suddenly the score becomes (4, 4) , the evidence shows that A's players will feel disappointed and anxious, changing the incentives under which they act (Cresswell & Eklund, 2006) . But the theoretical assumption of stationarity is clearly applicable to the case of matches between high performance teams. For instance, consider the first round of the Rugby World Cup 2015, when All Blacks (New Zealand's national team), the best team of the world, played against Los Pumas (Argentina's team), an irregular team. At the start of the second half Los Pumas were 4 points ahead. All Blacks, arguably the best rugby team of the world (and one of the best in any sport (Conkey, 2017) ), instead of losing temper kept playing in a "relaxed" mode. This ensured that they ended winning the game by 26 to 16 (Cleary, 2015) . So, the assumption of stationarity seems acceptable for high performance teams, reflecting their mental strength. We have that, Lemma 1 (Massó-Neme (1996)). Let s ∈ S. There exist two natural numbers M, R ∈ N such that (a, b) t+R (s) = (a, b) t+R+M (s) for every t ≥ 1. That is, a stationary strategy (every strategy in our framework) produces a finite cycle of instantaneous games of length M after R periods. 1. We say that s l and s l are directly connected, denoted
2. We say that s l and s l are connected, denoted s l ≈ s l , if there exist
Then, we have (for simplicity we assume an initial event (a, b) and a scoring system S):
where U j(r) i is i's payoff function in the instantaneous game (a, b) R+r (s) and (e A , e B ) R+r is the profile of choices in that game.
This means that the payoff of a stationary strategy is obtained as the average of the payoffs of the cycle. To apply this result in our setting, we have to characterize the set of feasible payoffs of G:
We have that: The definition of Nash equilibria in this game is the usual one:
The following result characterizes the equilibrium payoffs of G:
Theorem 2 (Massó-Neme (1996)). Let v be a feasible payoff of G. Then v is an equilibrium payoff if and only if there exist s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ∈ S, and (α 1 ,
) and the payoff v i is better or equal than the higher payoff that team i can guarantee by itself through a deviation of the cycles of s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , the connected cycles and the initial path from those strategies.
In words: v is an equilibrium payoff if each team gets a better pay than the pay they can get if they deviate. Finally, with all these definitions and theorems at hand, we can analyze the game where two teams that are far away in the position table face each other, so we set = 0 in the utility functions, disregarding the importance of blocking the attacks of the other team and focusing on scoring tries.
The set of feasible payoffs of this game is given, as said, by a convex combination of payoffs of stationary strategies. The feasible payoffs region corresponding to each point system are represented in Figures 2 to 4 . In each figure we can also see the minimax payoffs for the cycles favoring team A. 9 Every feasible payoff above and to the right of the minimax payoff is an equilibrium payoff. Figure 2 shows the results for the N B system and Table 5 shows the cycles that receive that minimax payoffs. 
Minimax payoff
Cycle (2.16, 2.16) c(0, 0), c(1, 1), c(2, 2), c(3, 3), c(4, 4) , c(5, 5), c(6, 6), c(7, 7) (4, 1)
c (1, 0), c(2, 1), c(3, 2), c(4, 3) , c (5, 4) , c(5, 5), c (7, 6) , c(7, 5)(7, 6) (4, 0.16) c (2, 0), c(3, 1), c(4, 2) , c (5, 3) , c (6, 4) , c(7, 5), c(7, 4)(7, 5) (4, 0) c(3, 0), c(4, 1), c(5, 2), c (6, 3) , c(7, 4) c(4, 0), c (5, 1), c(6, 2), c(7, 3) , c(5, 0), c(6, 1), c(7, 2)c(6, 0), c(7, 1), c(7, 0) (4, 2.16) c(7, 6)(7, 7) Table 6 show the results for the 3+ system. (6, 1) , c(7, 2)c(6, 0), c(7, 1), c(7, 0) (4, 2.16) c(7, 6)(7, 7) (5, 0.16) c(7, 4)(7, 5) Table 3 : 3+ System Finally, Figure 4 and Table 7 do the same for the +4 system. The fact that some minimax payoffs are outside the feasible region indicates that some cycles do not have equilibrium payoffs, so one or both of the teams have incentives to change strategies and get a better payoff. When we consider the joint efforts that yield the minimax payoffs we obtain an average joint effort of (0, 0) in the N B system, (0.18, 0.18) in the 3+ system and (0.1776, 0.1776) in the +4 system.
Empirical Evidence
In order to check the empirical soundness of our theoretical analyses we will use a database of 473 rugby matches. They were played from 1987 to 2015 in different competitions, including the Rugby Word Cup, the Six Nations and club tournaments. We compiled this database drawing data from different sources ([12]- [23] ). Each match is represented by a vector with four components, namely the number of tries of the local team, the number of tries of the visiting team, as well as the scores of the winning and the losing team, respectively. We perform a Least Squares analysis to explain the number of tries of each team and the differences in scores in terms of some explanatory variables. We consider as such the scoring system used in each match (our key variable), the nature of each team (a club team or a national team), a time trend and a constant. The selection of this kind of analysis is justified by, on one hand, its simplicity, but on the other because we lack a panel or temporal structure which could provide a richer information. Notice also that it is natural to posit a linear model in the presence of categorical variables (e.g. the scoring system in a tournament) (Wooldridge, 2020) . We run OLS regressions on different variants of the aforementioned general model, changing the way in which explanatory variables are included of changing the sample of matches to be analyzed. In the latter case we divided the entire sample in terms of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of teams playing in each match. In all cases we had to use robust errors estimators to handle the heteroskedasticity of the models. Also, assuming that each tournament is idiosyncratic, we controlled for clustered errors. The general functional form of the model can be stated as:
There are many alternative ways of characterizing the dependent variable, which represents the number of tries in a match i, i.e. T i . The first and obvious choice is to define it as the total number of tries in a match. But we also analyze variants in which we allow T i to represent either the number of tries of the local team, of the visitor team, the difference between them, those of the winning team (be it as a local or visiting team) and those of the losing team. With respect of our variable of interest, i.e. the system of bonus points, we specify +4 as the categorical base, to compare it to the 3+ and no bonus systems, represented by means of dummy variables, denoted C2 and C3 for N B and 3+ respectively. Both γ and X are vectors, containing the control variables and their parameters. We will vary the composition of X in order to check the robustness of the effects of the scoring systems. Finally, β 0 is the constant, while is the error term (specified to account for heterokedasticity or clustered errors) We will first present the descriptive statistics of the database. Then we give the results of the regressions on the different models built by varying both the definition of the dependent and the explanatory variables. Finally, we divide the sample in the classes of matches played by homogeneous or heterogeneous rivals, to compare their results for the same model. Figure 5 illustrates different aspects of the distribution of the number of tries in the database of matches. Notice that the number of matches is not the same under the three scoring methods: for +4 we have 260, 93 under N B and 120 under 3+. Nevertheless the evidence indicates that the 3+ scoring method yields the highest scores, hinting that it is the one that induces a more aggressive play.
Descriptive Statistics

Samples and Exploratory Regressions
We run regressions on different specifications of the general model represented by expression (1) in order to make inferences beyond the casual evidence. We use the variable code, to represent the scoring system, with the base value 1 for +4, 2 for N B and 3 for 3+, as we expressed above with the variables C2 and C3 in (1) . For T i we use different specifications, namely T riesT otal, T riesLocal and T riesV is, representing the number of total tries, tries by the local team and tries of the visiting team, respectively. With respect to the control variables X we use different selections from a set that includes SR is a dummy variable indicating that a match correspond to a Super Rugby tournament ( because Super Rugby is clearly different from the other tournaments analyzed here); Club, which indicates whether a match is played by club teams or not; previous, a dichotomous variable taking value 1 on the older matches in our database, namely those played between 1987 and 1991. Of particular interest are two variables that can be included in X. One is dif f = |T riesLocal − T riesV is| representing the difference in absolute value between the tries of the local and the visiting team. The other, related, control variable is dif f 2 = T riesLocal − T riesV is, capturing the possible advantage of being the local team. Finally, we include year as to capture the possible existence of a temporal trend. The results can be seen in Table 5 . 10 It can be seen that 3+ is indeed the scoring method that achieves the highest number of tries, namely between 1 and over 2 more than +4 (which is our benchmark). N B induces, in general, less tries than +4, except in the case of number of tries of the visiting teams. With respect to the control variables, we can see that SR has a negative impact while Club and previous have a positive influence. The time trend is Table 6 presents the results of running the aforementioned regressions but only on the class of matches between homogeneous teams. 11 The dependent variables of the regressions are on the first rows, where the first four columns indicate robust errors while the other four give the errors clustered by tournaments. The transition from +4 to N B does not make a difference in robust errors but it does so for tournament errors, adding a little more than half a try (not for the losing team, for which it does not make any difference). The effect of changing from +4 to 3+ is stronger, adding more than 2 total tries and more than 1 for the winning team. On the other hand, any of the scoring systems induces almost 2 more total tries in club tournaments than with national teams. Finally, nor year or the constant are significant.
The Homogeneous Case
The Non-Homogeneous Case
This analysis, represented in Table 7 is performed on the same variables and with the same interpretation of errors as the previous case, but including all the matches. We do not find differences between N B and +4. 3+, instead, makes a difference, although with a lower impact than in the homogeneous case. Another relevant difference is that in this case the effect of Club gets reversed. That is, winning teams score less while losing ones more, reducing in almost 2 tries the differences with national teams. Another interesting feature is that year becomes significant. That is, there exists a trend towards increasing the differences in time.
Final Remarks
All the results obtained, both in the general case and distinguishing between homogeneous and heterogeneous teams, indicate that the results of our theoretical models seem to hold in the real world.
Conclusions
The results of analyzing rugby games in theoretical and empirical terms are consistent. The 3+ system induces teams to exert more effort both in the static and empirical models. Moreover, in the particular instance analyzed of the dynamic model, with = 0, the result is the same. In all the models, we find that the 3+ system ranks first, +4 second and N B third. While choosing different values of in the dynamical model may change a bit the results, it seems that a sports planner should use the 3+ bonus point system if the goal is to make the game more entertaining. Some possible extensions seem appropiate topics for future research. If we consider as a measure of the "distance" between teams playing in a league, the choice of the appropriate bonus point system may depend on the teams and the moment of the tournament they are playing. Incentives at the beggining are not the same at the end of the tournament. The idea of conditionalizing the design of a tournament taking into account this in an optimal way, can be of high interest. 
